A naturalistic account of ethics

I don't think there is anything original here. but I was inspired to jot down my thoughts about ethics during a slack hour and then I thought I might as well make them public.

A Naturalistic Account of Ethics and Morality

We are often disposed to help others even when it is at our own expense. For example we often:

• have compassion for those who are suffering, and act to prevent suffering even when doing so causes us difficulty or pain.
• feel guilty when we fail in our commitments to others even we could get away with it
• want reward and punishment to be distributed fairly, even when we might do better if the distribution is unfair
  

I will call this type of disposition a moral disposition.

Moral dispositions compete with other dispositions which are more selfish. For example, we like to accumulate wealth, avoid pain, wield power, and some people even like to inflict suffering (sadism). Sometimes our moral dispositions win out; sometimes our amoral dispositions win out.

Acting according to moral dispositions is what we call altruism or ethical behaviour.

We sometimes fool others (and ourselves) into thinking we are acting out of a moral disposition when we are actually being selfish.

There are cultural rules that are built on these dispositions e.g. by directing our sense of obligation to a deity and the rules that deity has imposed.

Most people share a core set of moral dispositions. For example, most people want to limit the suffering of innocent people, other things being equal.

However, there are also differences and these differences can become extreme when dealing with cultural rules.

Nevertheless, because we share so many of our fundamental moral dispositions we usually assume that we can agree on what is right or wrong, good or bad, if we work on it. We act as if judgements about morality are objective. We suspend our subjectivity.

There are some issues on which it is difficult to see how those with different moral views can come to agreement. For example, some people believe that early abortion is equivalent to murder. Others do not.

It is not possible to tell for certain to what extent moral dispositions are genetic or cultural. However, it seems highly probable that there is some genetic element.

To the extent that these dispositions are genetic then they have evolved.

This is the social and psychological infrastructure on which our moral language – our statements about right and wrong, duty and obligation - is built.

Because we share a lot of our altruistic dispositions we have similar reactions to similar circumstances. For example, if we see someone inflicting pain on an innocent child most of us condemn that action and will be prepared to sacrifice some personal interest to stop it. So when someone says “inflicting pain on an innocent child is wrong” they are expressing a view about the circumstances, their reaction to those circumstances, and what they think should happen.

This language sounds similar to a purely descriptive statement. But it also implies action and is actually different.

We can use a similar form of language to say “this child is fair haired” because there is so much agreement about altruistic dispositions.

A statement such as “child torture is wrong” is not simply a description of the speaker’s state of mind. It is also reflects the speaker’s belief that others would agree if only they knew all the facts and saw things in the appropriate light.

Compare “child torture is wrong” with “this picture is beautiful”. If someone else disagrees with the latter statement we might be surprised and believe we can persuade them otherwise. But it is also acceptable to agree to differ. But moral statements are linked to suffering and pleasure and we are motivated to do something about it not just reflect on its morality. Therefore we cannot agree to differ.

Imagine if someone says this picture is beautiful and the other says “no its ugly and I plan to destroy it”.

An alternative account of ethics

An alternative is to suppose that there is an additional moral property “good” or “bad” that applies to some objects, actions and situations which is as objective as saying something is “red” or “over 10 kilograms” or “lasts for 10 minutes”.

In this account the statement “child torture is wrong” is a description. It says that the property of wrongness applies to this activity. This is sometimes called the realist account of morality.

Problems with the realist account

This account inserts a set of properties between the physical features of an action, object or event and our attempts either to encourage or prevent that action, object or event. Suppose I observe an innocent child in unnecessary pain. Like most people I will typically act to prevent it – other things being equal. The realist model is that the unnecessary pain leads to the conclusion that the situation is bad which places a duty on me to prevent that suffering. This creates two problems. One is the transition from the state – child suffering – to the conclusion – the situation is bad. How do I come to the conclusion that this is a bad situation just because the child is suffering? The other is the transition from the conclusion – the situation is bad – to the action – try to stop it. Why am I motivated to stop the situation just because it has the property bad.

Stage 1 of the realist model: How do we know what is good?

To examine the problems with this stage it is necessary to differentiate two variations of this account.

Is goodness something over and above the material considerations that lead us to say “this is good”? For example, consider the property “square”. If we have a shape that has four equal sides at right-angles to each other then we can also say it has the property of being square and deduce other properties such as the length of the diagonal . These are not an additional properties. They are logical deductions from given attributes of the object.

Is badness a logical deduction from the unpleasant consequences of an action or object or is it something new over and above the consequences – like knowing that the object is red as well as square?

If badness is a logical deduction then it should follow from the facts that we have observed directly or indirectly via some logical rules. The problem is what are the logical rules and how do we know them to be true? A rule that allowed us to deduce whether something was good or bad would presumably be of the form:

If conditions X and Y apply then this action is good.

But it is hard to imagine a satisfactory rule and how it can be shown to be correct. Every such rule can be challenged by appealing to exceptions and it is not clear how to resolve these challenges. For example, suppose this rule was proposed: “If the action maximises the happiness of the greatest number of people then it is good”. i.e. utilitarianism. This leads to all the well-known objections to utilitarianism e.g. it suggests we should humanely put down babies who are going to have miserable lives or will cause their parents miserable lives. The point being that there is no logical way to resolve this. It requires an appeal back to our sensibilities.

On the other hand if morality is not a deduction, but a property over and above other attributes, then the question is - how do we get to know if that property is present? It seems clear that we don’t perceive goodness over and above the many things that lead us to pronounce the action or object good. It is the observable details of an action that cause us to pronounce it good or otherwise. So what is the connection between what we observe and its moral status? Inflicting pain on a child is wrong. But, if he wrongness of that deed is a property in addition to the infliction of pain, how do we go from observing that the pain to knowing that the deed is wrong? This seems to be unanswerable.

Stage 2 of the realist model: Why do what is good and prevent what is bad?

Even if we have established that an action or object has the property bad. We still need to know why this leads people to try to prevent it. What do we say to the person who admits that child torture is evil but does not consider that a reason for preventing it? Where is the link between predicate and action? Again there seems to be no solution to this problem unless the realist wants to suppose a disposition to do things that are good and avoid things that are evil. In which case why not go straight to the naturalistic model and suppose a disposition to be altruistic? The predicates good, bad, right, wrong etc don't seem to add anything.